18 research outputs found
Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in
large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated
supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of
some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on
actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way
games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism,
can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a
Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is
budget-balanced, individually rational, and efficient. To address this negative
result, we propose a privacy-preserving mechanism that is incentive-compatible
and budget-balanced, satisfies ex-post individual rationality conditions, and
produces an outcome which is more efficient than the equilibrium without
payments. The mechanism is based on a single-offer bargaining and we show that
a randomized multi-offer extension brings no additional benefit.Comment: An earlier, shorter version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of
the Twenty-Fourth International joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI) 201
Measuring and Optimizing Cultural Markets
Social influence has been shown to create significant unpredictability in
cultural markets, providing one potential explanation why experts routinely
fail at predicting commercial success of cultural products. To counteract the
difficulty of making accurate predictions, "measure and react" strategies have
been advocated but finding a concrete strategy that scales for very large
markets has remained elusive so far. Here we propose a "measure and optimize"
strategy based on an optimization policy that uses product quality, appeal, and
social influence to maximize expected profits in the market at each decision
point. Our computational experiments show that our policy leverages social
influence to produce significant performance benefits for the market, while our
theoretical analysis proves that our policy outperforms in expectation any
policy not displaying social information. Our results contrast with earlier
work which focused on showing the unpredictability and inequalities created by
social influence. Not only do we show for the first time that dynamically
showing consumers positive social information under our policy increases the
expected performance of the seller in cultural markets. We also show that, in
reasonable settings, our policy does not introduce significant unpredictability
and identifies "blockbusters". Overall, these results shed new light on the
nature of social influence and how it can be leveraged for the benefits of the
market
Optimizing Expected Utility in a Multinomial Logit Model with Position Bias and Social Influence
Motivated by applications in retail, online advertising, and cultural
markets, this paper studies how to find the optimal assortment and positioning
of products subject to a capacity constraint. We prove that the optimal
assortment and positioning can be found in polynomial time for a multinomial
logit model capturing utilities, position bias, and social influence. Moreover,
in a dynamic market, we show that the policy that applies the optimal
assortment and positioning and leverages social influence outperforms in
expectation any policy not using social influence
The benefits of social influence in optimized cultural markets
Social influence has been shown to create significant unpredictability in cultural markets, providing one potential explanation why experts routinely fail at predicting commercial success of cultural products. As a result, social influence is often presented in a negative light. Here, we show the benefits of social influence for cultural markets. We present a policy that uses product quality, appeal, position bias and social influence to maximize expected profits in the market. Our computational experiments show that our profit-maximizing policy leverages social influence to produce significant performance benefits for the market, while our theoretical analysis proves that our policy outperforms in expectation any policy not displaying social signals. Our results contrast with earlier work which focused on showing the unpredictability and inequalities created by social influence. Not only do we show for the first time that, under our policy, dynamically showing consumers positive social signals increases the expected profit of the seller in cultural markets. We also show that, in reasonable settings, our profit-maximizing policy does not introduce significant unpredictability and identifies "blockbusters". Overall, these results shed new light on the nature of social influence and how it can be leveraged for the benefits of the market